The Clando Conundrum: Traversing the Legal Labyrinth of Cameroon’s Hybrid Transport Economy

By Banyong Fonyam Jonie Jr., Managing Partner, Fonyam and Partners Law Firm (Douala, Cameroon) Seasoned Commercial & Legal Adviser | Specializing in Transport Logistics, Startup Compliance, and Regulatory Frameworks

Introduction: A Clash of Two Systems

The streets of Douala, Yaoundé, Kribi, Limbe, Baffoussam and Buea present a fascinating microcosm of a modern African economic dilemma. On one hand, the sleek, app-branded vehicles of Yango, Gozem, Zygo, Vorides and Easy Ride represent a new wave of digital formalization. On the other, the pervasive and agile “clando” network—a term derived from clandestine—operates with a fluidity that often bypasses formal structures. This isn’t merely a competition for passengers; it is a fundamental clash between established legal frameworks and powerful socio-economic realities.

As a legal practitioner manouevring this space for clients in both camps, the critical question is not which system will win, but how Cameroon’s regulatory environment can evolve to create a fair, safe, and sustainable ecosystem for all. This analysis will explore this tension through the lens of the Law No. 2001/015 of 23rd July 2001, which remains the primary text governing the road transport regime in Cameroon, having repealed the earlier 1990 legislation.

1. The Extant Law: What Law No. 2001/015 Actually Provides

The 2001 law is clear and unequivocal in its intent to formalize and regulate road transport for hire. Its key provisions that are directly contravened by the clando phenomenon include:

· Licensing and Authorization (Articles 6, 7, 8): The law mandates that any vehicle used for the carriage of persons or goods for reward must be classified as a “public transport vehicle” and obtain the relevant professional license (carte professionnelle), vehicle registration certificate (carte jaune), and be operated under an approved transport licence.

· Technical Compliance and Capacity (Articles 29, 30): Vehicles are required to undergo regular technical inspections to ensure roadworthiness. Crucially, they must strictly adhere to their manufacturer’s permitted load and passenger capacity. The common sight of sedans carrying 7+ passengers or goods vehicles grossly overloaded is a direct violation.

· Tax and Social Security Obligations (Article 75 et seq.): Professional transport operators are required to fulfil specific fiscal and social security contributions. The informal nature of clando operations means these revenues are largely lost to the state.

The law grants powers to control officers (agents verbalisateurs) to enforce these provisions, with penalties ranging from fines to impoundment.

2.  Why the Law is Flouted

Simply stating the law ignores the powerful forces that make the clando economy boom.

· Economic Survival & Unemployment: For many vehicle owners and even bike riders, picking up passengers going your way  and charging them a fare is not a choice but a necessity. In an economy with exorbitantly skyrocketed prices of fuel and high youth unemployment, a personal car or bike becomes a primary source of income. The high cost and bureaucratic hurdles of formalization (obtaining permits, insurance, taxes) make the informal route the only viable entry point.

· Market Demand & Efficiency: Clandos offer unmatched flexibility. They serve routes and hours that formal operators often neglect, provide door-to-door service often faster than fixed-route taxis, and are masters of price negotiation. This meets a clear and loud demand from the public for affordable and flexible mobility.

· The “Arrangement” Culture: The concept of “settling” control points, while illegal, is a deeply ingrained cultural nuance in tackling bureaucracy. For a clando driver, a negotiated, on-the-spot fine (un petit arrangement) is often treated as an informal operating cost—one that is still cheaper than full formal compliance.

3. The Legal Challenges Posed by Ride-Sharing Platforms

The advent of app-based tech startups has complicated the legal landscape further. They exist in a regulatory grey area:

· Are they Transport Operators or Technology Companies? This is the core legal question. They often argue they are mere digital intermediaries connecting independent driver-partners with users. However, Law No. 2001/015 does not anticipate this model. This ambiguity allows them to operate without fully bearing the burdens of the formal transport sector (e.g., fleet compliance, direct employee costs for drivers).

· Unfair Competition Allegations: Formal taxi cooperatives and inter-urban transport agencies rightly argue that ride-sharing platforms and clandos create an unlevel playing field. While compliant operators bear the full cost of licenses, inspections, and taxes, their informal competitors do not, allowing them to offer cheaper rates.

· Liability Issues: In the event of an accident, untangling liability becomes a legal nightmare. Is it the “partner” driver’s responsibility? Does the platform bear any liability for vetting the driver or the roadworthiness of the vehicle? The 2001 law is silent on this.

4. Potential Regulatory Evolutions: A Path Forward

The goal of regulation should not be to simply eradicate the clando system, but to harness its entrepreneurial energy and integrate it into a revised, modernized framework. Here are potential evolutions:

1. Create a New, Hybrid Legal Category: The law should be amended to create a new category for “App-Based Transport Intermediaries” or “Private Hire Vehicles.” This would bring companies like Yango and Gozem explicitly under the law’s purview, with clear obligations for driver vetting, vehicle inspection, data reporting, and fiscal contributions.

2. Simplify and Reduce Formalization Costs: The government could introduce a streamlined, affordable licensing and insurance package for individual owner-operators. A tiered system that allows a personal vehicle to be used for commercial purposes upon meeting basic safety and insurance criteria could bring thousands of clandos out of the shadows.

3. Leverage Technology for Enforcement: Instead of relying solely on physical control points, which are prone to “settling,” the Ministry of Transport, Directorate general of taxes and other regulatory bodies could partner with platforms. Data on trips, fares, and driver activity could be used for automated tax collection and compliance monitoring, making the system more efficient and less corruptible.

4. Safety-Centric Amendments: The law must be updated to explicitly address liability for app-based services, ensuring passenger safety and recourse are paramount. Mandatory in-app panic buttons, verified driver profiles, and clear insurance requirements for every trip should be non-negotiable legal standards.

Conclusion

The persistence of the clando economy and the rise of digital platforms are not a sign of a failing law but a signal that the law has been outpaced by reality. Law No. 2001/015, while well-intentioned, is a statute of the past trying to govern a future that has already arrived.

The path forward requires courage and innovation from policymakers. It demands a move away from pure enforcement towards intelligent regulation that recognizes economic pressures, acknowledges cultural nuances, and leverages technology. By creating a framework that lowers the barriers to formalization while raising the standards for safety and fairness, Cameroon can transform a contentious “clando conundrum” into a thriving, inclusive, and modern mobility ecosystem.

This is not just a transport issue; it is a critical test of Cameroon’s ability to adapt its legal and economic institutions to the digital age.

Banyong Fonyam Jonie Jr

Cameroon Law, Transport Law, Regulatory Compliance, Innovation, Clando Taxis, Yango, Gozem, Vorides, Wakaride, Digital Economy, Public Policy, Urban Mobility, Fonyam And Partners, Legal Insights